• Americans will use voting computers with secret software that has not been sufficiently scrutinized, just as they have in past elections.
• They will have to trust computers to record and count their votes correctly – computers that are not advanced enough to ensure the security and accuracy that could justify their trust.
• If something odd occurs, manual recounts of the original ballots will be impossible, because the only record of the votes will be in electronic form, which will, of course, match the questionable tally.

HAVA isn’t a solution

In response to the 2000 Florida debacle, Congress passed a law, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which mandates voting process reform in all the states. Unfortunately, many are interpreting the requirements in a way that does not provide the safeguards necessary to ensure integrity in our elections.

• HAVA requires that voters be able to verify their ballots before they are cast and counted.
• HAVA requires that all voting machines provide a “permanent paper record with a manual audit capacityâ€? and that the voter must be given the “opportunity to change the ballot or correct any error before the permanent paper is produced.“

Mr. Darryl R. Wold, former chairman of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) believes that HAVA requires a voter-verifiable paper trail. Senator John Ensign (R-NV), who contributed the audit requirements now incorporated into HAVA, explains that the intent of the provision was to provide a voter-verifiable paper trail. However, many proponents of touch screen voting systems are claiming that the HAVA requirement does not mean the system must allow the voter to verify the paper record. They claim the HAVA requirements are met if the voter verifies a screen version of the ballot, and if a paper report can be printed later for audit purposes. However, if the voters cannot verify the actual audit record in the voting booth, meaningful recounts are impossible since the recount would simply be an identical re-tabulation of the original count that was in question. Since HAVA remains open to this kind of interpretation, it does not provide a solution.

Fixing software isn’t a solution

In July 2003, computer researchers from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities published a scathing review of one of the most widely used electronic voting computers, the Diebold touch screen. Their analysis showed that the software was badly designed, full of errors, and open to fraud.

Some people say that the manufacturers could simply fix the software, and the problem will be solved. However, they fail to see that the solution is not that simple. There are two unfixable problems with electronic voting machines:

• No one knows how to write bug-free software. The more complex the software, the more difficult it is to find the bugs, and election software is very complex.
• Malicious code embedded into the software could go undetected. Neither close inspection of the code nor thorough testing of the computer could ensure that malicious software has not slipped through the cracks.

Here’s a solution!

Representative Rush Holt has already proposed a solution, in the form of a bill introduced into the House. The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act (H.R. 2239) would mandate the necessary safeguards for U.S. elections in every state. Now we need to get the bill out of the Committee on House Administration and bring it to action on the floor.

When enacted, this federal law would require all states to use election equipment that provides a voter-verifiable paper audit trail.

• This means that voters could check a paper ballot or paper record of the ballot for accuracy before casting the vote --without having to trust the voting machine. Voter verification of ballots is crucial, because only the voter can check whether the ballot is accurate.
• A paper audit trail makes it possible to reconstruct the election results from the original voter-verified records, without having to trust the election equipment. In other words, it is possible to do a meaningful recount if an election is in dispute.

Working together with others across the nation, we must convince our Congress to pass H.R.2239. Click here to find out how you can help.

But ...

Just in case our representatives in Congress don’t take this problem as seriously as they really should, we can address the problem state by state and county by county.

Working together with others in our states, we must convince our state legislatures to take action to safeguard our elections. Click here to find out how you can help.